

VZCZCXRO1963
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0049/01 0651022
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061022Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6246
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0701
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1256
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC
RUESDT/DTRA-OSSES DARMSTADT GE
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1196

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 USOSCE 000049

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
JCS FOR J-5
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI)
NSC FOR HAYES
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL
EUCOM FOR J-5
CENTCOM FOR J-5
UNVIE FOR AC
GENEVA FOR CD

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [KCFE](#) [OSCE](#) [RS](#) [XG](#)

SUBJECT: AIAM MARCH 3-4: LIVELIER IF NOT UNFAMILIAR: RUSSIA
CALLS FOR NEW CSBMS (PART 1)

¶1. (U) Note: This is the first of two cables reporting the March 3-4 OSCE Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting. End note.

¶2. (SBU) Summary: While the 2009 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) was livelier than 2008, national positions remained largely unchanged. Russia continued to insist that the Vienna Document 1999 and other OSCE political-military agreements were obsolete or dying. Russia circulated a detailed critique of the Vienna Document and a revision of an earlier proposal for naval CSBMs. Russia also called again for an embargo of offensive arms transfers to Georgia. Russia and Georgia agreed that risk reduction and crisis stabilization measures could not work without political will.

¶3. (SBU) The U.S. urged greater emphasis on implementation of the existing documents and doubted the wisdom of reopening CSBMs when Russia had suspended implementation of CFE. The U.S. also doubted the utility or necessity of naval CSBMs, noting the lack of any security issue involving naval forces that Russia's CSBM would address.

¶4. (SBU) Norway proposed to increase the number of evaluation quotas while Denmark suggested increasing the numbers on inspections and evaluation teams. Turkey plans to make a proposal for more liberal rules for use of digital cameras and GPS equipment. Germany confirmed it will propose standards for military commanders' briefings. The UK and Russia circulated a draft Best Practice Guide for Chapter IV contacts. Finland, Germany, Switzerland and others called for aligning OSCE SALW work with the UN Program of Action. Switzerland and Finland want to ensure that technical

consultations among heads of verification are available to future AIAMs. End summary.

Working Session 1: Vienna Document 1999

Annual Exchange of Military Information

¶5. (SBU) Ukraine urged states to provide more than just the minimum information required by the Vienna Document 1999 (VD99). Norway noted that its own forces were shrinking and moving away from a brigade-based structure, so the amount of information provided was also diminished. In these circumstances, more clarity was needed in defining the equipment that was subject to reporting. Russia claimed that the information provided under the AEMI was irrelevant to actual post-Cold War conditions. Turkey urged states to comply with reporting deadlines and suggested that failure to do so was due to lack of political will. Turkey and Finland urged states to comply with the electronic filing requirements of FSC.DEC/17/07.

Defense Planning

¶6. (SBU) Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden supported the Russian proposal to establish a single deadline for submission of defense planning information. The U.S.

USOSCE 00000049 002 OF 006

(Neighbour) replied that a single deadline is impractical, because of varying legislative calendars, and unnecessary, as there was no evidence that a single deadline would increase the number of submissions, 30 in 2008. The U.S. did support further exploration of the Swiss suggestion to make experts available to states who requested assistance in preparing their submissions.

¶7. (SBU) Turkey, Italy, and Norway supported the U.S. position that the proposal did nothing to remedy the problem of non-compliance. Italy and Norway similarly recommended further efforts at mutual support. Azerbaijan also opposed the proposal, adding there was no need for additional decisions that only increase the burden of compliance.

¶8. (SBU) Russia replied that if the U.S. had a budget problem that prevented timely submission, there was nothing in the proposal to prevent this. The U.S. would merely need to explain the reason for the delay and estimate when the information would be available. Establishing an "administrative" deadline would allow the Conflict Prevention Center to send reminders to delinquent states.

¶9. (SBU) Ireland suggested that treating defense planning separately from defense budgets might address the timeliness issue, as the former was usually a multi-year effort while budgets were annual requirements.

Risk Reduction

¶10. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) noted that, based on personal experience of service at the UN Security Council, the Chapter III risk reduction mechanism seemed designed to increase rather than abate tensions. The procedures were cumbersome and culminated only in convening the entire FSC: not necessarily the best way to defuse a crisis. Perhaps it was no accident the chapter had only been invoked a few times, most recently in May 2008 (the Georgia UAV shoot down). Ulyanov archly suggested that perhaps the mechanism was effective as it allowed states to pursue their own agendas, citing "the grievous problems in Georgia and South Ossetia that culminated in war." He said that the new European

Security Treaty Russia had offered would encourage the construction of an effective crisis resolution mechanism.

¶11. (SBU) Georgia (Giorgadze) agreed that perhaps Chapter III was not ideal, but in the end what mattered was the political will of a state to abide by international norms and commitments. Giorgadze asserted that the "UN and most states" believe Russia violated its international commitments when its aircraft shot down a Georgian UAV in 2008.

¶12. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) also agreed Chapter III was not perfect, but recalled that it did lead to useful dialogue over the UAV incident. The war in August 2008 was not the fault of VD99 but rather, as Georgia had remarked, a matter of political will. If one country is determined to go to war, then a risk reduction mechanism cannot stop it.

¶13. (SBU) Russia retorted that Georgia had long planned to attack Abkhazia but had been deterred by Russia. Georgia

USOSCE 00000049 003 OF 006

then attacked South Ossetia instead. Russia did not accept the verdict of the experts who concluded it had shot down Georgia's UAV. Russia still has not been allowed to examine the evidence the experts relied on.

¶14. (SBU) Greece (Sourani) suggested the mechanism could also be discussed at the Annual Security Review Conference in June.

Prior Notification and Observation

¶15. (SBU) The Czech Republic (Reinohlova) and Sweden (Ekengren) supported voluntary notification of sub-threshold military activities. The Czechs had begun reporting these in 2006 after the related FSC decision in 2005; Reinohlova reported another exercise, "Collective Shield 2009," which would prepare a Czech component for the Euro battle group. Turkey, noting some of its own voluntary notifications, expressed disappointment with the number of sub-threshold notices.

¶16. (SBU) Belarus (Pavlov) and Russia called for mandatory sub-threshold notifications. Russia claimed Chapters V, VI, VII, and VIII, involving prior notification and observation of military activities and annual calendars, were "practically dead letters, unlikely to ever function." Given the disappointing level of notifications, the only options were to eliminate the requirement or lower the reporting threshold. The Netherlands (Kleinjan) and the UK (Gare) opposed, in effect, lowering the thresholds for notification agreed to in VD99. Azerbaijan needed to review the requirement in light of "real world" conditions, noting that "infringements" of VD99 requirements pertaining to weapons and equipment should not be tolerated.

Contacts

¶17. (SBU) The UK and Russia circulated a draft BPG for implementation of Chapter IV on Contacts (FSC.AIAM/8/09). Sweden, Denmark, Armenia, the Netherlands, and Finland voiced support for the guide. Sweden suggested that a participating States should participate in a Contact visit before trying to organize one. Norway proposed, with support from Sweden and Luxembourg, that the observer States should produce a formal report of the contact visit.

¶18. (SBU) Many delegations announced their plans to host contact visits to airbases and/or military facilities and/or weapon demonstrations. In 2009, nine participating States will host visits: Turkey (May), Hungary (May), the Netherlands (May), Spain (May), Albania (June), Ireland (September), Kazakhstan (September), the Czech Republic (October), and Germany (October). In 2010, two participating States will host contact visits: Switzerland (April), and

Belgium (TBD).

Inspection and Evaluation

¶19. (SBU) Norway, supported by Denmark, introduced a paper on "Inspection and Evaluation Visit Quotas," (FSC.AIAM/5/09). The paper concludes there is a need for more evaluation

USOSCE 00000049 004 OF 006

visits and proposed to adjust the quota calculation system, on a voluntary basis, in order to double the number of passive evaluation quotas.

¶20. (SBU) Denmark also offered a paper, supported by Norway, on the "Size of Inspection and Evaluation Teams" (FSC.AIAM/6/09), which proposes an increase in the number of inspection team members, from four to five, and an increase in evaluation team members from three to four. Denmark believed that an increase in the number of implementers would improve multilateral cooperation and transparency, increase participation by pS, and thereby reduce the number of inspections conducted in place of evaluation quotas.

¶21. (SBU) Canada, the Czech Republic, and Greece offered support for the Norway/Denmark papers on quotas and team size. Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden welcomed the two papers and offered their willingness to engage in its discussion. The Netherlands was not satisfied with the current situation where passive quotas are exhausted on low level military activities and are not available for use later when there were significant military activities. The Netherlands proposed a gentlemen's agreement to not misuse the inspection regime. It does not support raising the number of quotas, spreading quotas, or lowering military threshold as this would lead to more inspections/evaluations.

¶22. (SBU) Belgium emphasized the right of each pS to determine when to request an inspection. It agreed with the analysis calling for an increase in the number of evaluation quotas. Though Belgium expressed doubt as to whether an increase in evaluations/inspections would improve the quality of the inspections, it offered support for more quotas. Hungary also agreed on the need for more quotas, but on a voluntary basis.

¶23. (SBU) Greece, Kazakhstan, and Slovakia cautioned that any proposal should take into account the additional financial costs as the world is in the middle of a financial crisis. Denmark and Norway countered that their proposals would reduce the overall cost of implementation since it would lead to a decrease in the number of inspections which are more costly to conduct than evaluations.

¶24. (SBU) Sweden said that an important by-product of inspections and evaluations is confidence-building established during military contacts. The 109 inspections in 2008 had led to interactions among more than 1000 arms control personnel. Italy disagreed, asserting that maintaining good relations is not the purpose of inspection.

¶25. (SBU) Turkey said it intends to submit a paper on the use of digital camera and GPS equipment during inspections. The paper will propose that inspection teams be allowed to use digital cameras without advance permission from the receiving state; if an inspection team's request is denied, the receiving state will provide a GPS device to the inspection team. Denmark supported this proposal.

¶26. (SBU) Germany informed that it will submit a proposal for a best practice guide (BPG) on briefing guidelines for military commanders during a VD99 evaluations and inspections.

USOSCE 00000049 005 OF 006

¶27. (SBU) Russia introduced its Food-for-Thought paper on "Analysis of the Implementation of the Vienna Document 1999" (FSC.AIAM/2/09). Russia remarked that the observations and recommendations in its paper are well known to delegations; Russia will return to these recommendations at the March 25 FSC. Austria responded that VD99 is one of the still functioning security mechanisms and argued that it should be fixed or changed before it is considered irremediably broken.

Denmark thought the paper could be a basis for future discussion. Turkey supported some of Russia's conclusions in the paper.

¶28. (SBU) Belarus pointed out the lack of consistency in the conduct of evaluation teams. States conduct evaluations using widely varying methods. Belarus called for the development of a common rule on the conduct of an evaluation.

¶29. (SBU) Switzerland revealed that it was denied the use of an interpreter during an inspection. It called for discussion on the definition of auxiliary personnel. Switzerland also called for a common definition on "force majeure."

Russian Visa Procedures

¶30. (SBU) Recalling the recent announcement by Russia on its plane-side visa policy, the U.S. (Grimley) asked Russia for clarification on its new visa procedures. The U.S. said it wanted to know how the new procedures would influence inspections done by multi-national inspection teams: whether the new procedures were temporary or permanent; and whether the new visa procedures would be coupled with POE diversion, resulting in obstruction of the VD99 regime. The UK and Denmark supported the U.S. intervention and also voiced concern. Russia (Ulyanov) assured that the new procedures were fully consistent with VD99 and requested the questions in writing so that it could fully respond. Ulyanov added that these issues were another reason example why VD99 should be updated as it lacks provisions for visas.

Force Majeure

¶31. (SBU) Citing a gap in VD99 Chapter IX concerning the lack of a definition of force majeure, Belarus called for future discussion on this topic. Belarus recalled that in 2001 the UK had proposed a paper on force majeure and offered to take the lead on this topic. Russia, backing Belarus, cited the misuse of force majeure by Georgia in refusing Russia's recent request for an inspection. Russia offers a definition of force majeure in its VD99 Food-for-Thought. Responding to Russia, Georgia asserted it had rightfully declared force majeure as Russia's invasion and occupation of Georgia were clearly acts outside its control.

¶32. (SBU) Switzerland, also in support of Belarus, recalled that Tajikistan had inappropriately declared force majeure in 2007 due to "bad weather and an energy crisis" to deny an inspection by Switzerland and Italy. Switzerland emphasized that force majeure should only be used in cases where there is a direct threat to the health and security of team

USOSCE 00000049 006 OF 006

members. Canada agreed that force majeure needs to be defined and said that it was still preparing a paper on force majeure.

Other Implementation Issues

¶33. (SBU) Moldova announced that access had been denied to an inspection team into a region (Transnistria) of its territory that was under the control of a separatist movement and

Russia. This inspection conducted by the UK was turned away by the Transnistrian "border guards" who claimed that the area was a security zone. The UK confirmed the incident. Russia replied that the situation is nothing new and wondered why pS insisted on inspecting an area where a conflict is ongoing. Russia suggested that pushing for an inspection simply made the situation worse.

¶34. (SBU) Switzerland reminded that a German/Swiss team was also denied, without explanation, its inspection request by Uzbekistan in 2008. Switzerland asked when this refusal would be resolved.

Regional Measures

¶35. (SBU) Turkey announced continued support for regional CSBMs as they promote transparency, confidence, and security. Turkey called attention to the benefits of the Black Sea CSBM and proposed adopting it for use in the Baltic region.

¶36. (SBU) Hungary cited the details of various multiple bilateral CSBMs and agreements it had with Ukraine, Serbia, Moldova, Montenegro, Cyprus and Kazakhstan. Hungary noted the positive results of each agreement.

¶37. (SBU) Ukraine announced VD99 Chapter X multilateral cooperation on its border with Belarus, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. Ukraine would also like to cooperate on its maritime borders with other pS.

¶38. (SBU) Kazakhstan announced that it had hosted three training events at its regional training center in 2008 and planned to do the same in 2009. Belarus informed that it invited observers to an autumn 2008 exercise to contribute to transparency in the region.

OSCE Communications Network

¶39. (SBU) The Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) reported that the OSCE Communications Network is functioning as designed and required. Some pS are still not connected and occasional problems have occurred as a result of power failures and internet connection disruption. The CPC stands ready to assist all pS as necessary. Armenia urged all pS to take necessary action to connect to the OSCE network. (End part 1.)
NEIGHBOUR